TAIWAN AND THE WORLD

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A Doctor's Tale

CHIANG WEI-SHUI

The road to creativity passes so close to the madhouse
and often detours or ends there.
ERNEST BECKER · 1997

It was the winter of 1919, and Paris was the center of discussion, as the place where the world's most powerful decision-makers had congregated to confabulate the creation of new countries and new organizations. Their purpose was to fashion peace on a continent that had been shaken to its very foundations by an adopted discourse of global supremacy. After four years of war Europe had been ripped apart, and although its major cities remained and its railway and harbor infrastructure were more or less intact, the loss was most keenly felt in the very fabric of its vision of a world order (MacMillan 2001, xxvi). The mechanized slaughter of millions removed any notion of the "civilizing missions of empire" that European powers believed they had. Europe was humbled. The revolutions of 1917 and the overthrow of the tsar pushed Russia outside the imagined boundaries of Europe. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had ceased to exist. The Ottoman Empire—the very "other" to the European "self"—had also vanished. Imperial Germany was now a republic. Old nations reemerged—Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, and Estonia—and new nations formed: Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Lines were drawn in the sand, and new boundaries emerged as the Treaty of

Versailles and the Paris Peace Conference were discussed, debated, agreed, and eventually conceded.

The winter of 1919 spoke many languages. It made many demands and complaints—and these were emphatically not just European.

However, amid the support for the right to independence or self-government, people from different parts of the world shared a common language of uncertainty. The way these issues were debated raised questions about whether this new world order would be an improvement. One method employed by a number of public intellectuals was to frame the past order as embedded in sickness. New nations would thus provide a cure.

The significance of these events did not go unnoticed in Taiwan. Economically, Taiwan benefited greatly when Japan filled the void left in the region by European powers preoccupied with European battlefields. Intellectuals like Chiang Wei-shui joined the writers utilizing analogies of sickness, madness, and disease as a means to express their demands for political change. Chiang translated incisive analyses of social issues into a transcultural context, offering a perspective on existentialism that sheds light on personal reflections amid the significant societal changes taking place. The beginnings of a nation were disruptive, and this period of the twentieth-century *interbellum* is especially illuminating, not just for Taiwan. Chiang's 1921 "Clinical Notes: A Patient Named Taiwan" (Linchuang jiangyi: Guanyu Taiwan zhege huanzhe), familiarly known as "A Patient Named Taiwan," in which the protagonist—a doctor—prescribes a maximum dose of education for slow but full recovery of the nation, contrasts with the Chinese writer Lu Xun's *Diary of a Madman* (Kuangren riji; 1918), where cannibalism serves as a metaphor for the oppressive feudalistic society of China. The sickness of insanity is particularly visible in the breakdown of the human spirit as a result of this oppression. European intellectuals similarly wrote about the consequent frustration and lack of individuality, which caused the descent into madness. Franz Kafka's protagonist in *A Country Doctor* (1917) is at an impasse, a conflict without clear resolution. The doctor—symbolic of the nation—is confronted with a choice between professional responsibility and desire. The experience of spatial and temporal disorder is intensified by the presence of shame and embarrassment: "It is a shame. And yet I am a doctor. What am I to do?" The internal conflict leads to self-exculpation, with the expression of

difficulties being faced by saying: "Believe me, it is not too easy for me either" (Kafka 1995, 224).

The doctor thus fights ignorance, selfishness, and superstition. He describes the condition of society as "the frost of this most unhappy of ages." For Kafka, this is mirrored in the beginning of the end. This sense of doom and superstition is repeated in the work of Abdullah Cevdet, an Ottoman Kurdish intellectual and medical doctor. In "Mezheb-i BahauIlah-Din-i Umem," published in *Ictihad* on 1 March 1922, Cevdet puts forth the argument that the challenges faced by Ottoman society can remedied only by addressing the "illnesses" present in the broader Muslim world. According to Cevdet, the nation's "sickness" is a result of the presence of institutionalized religion (Hanioğlu 1997, 140). His personal angst reflects the major societal change that came with the end of the Ottoman Empire and the beginnings of the modern Turkish state. In "A Patient Named Taiwan" Chiang Wei-shui depicted the country as afflicted by moral decay. According to Chiang, Taiwan was the victim of a corrupted human nature, as its people were focused solely on material possessions. The absence of spiritual guidance and the prevalence of polluted customs led them to immerse themselves in superstitions that were deemed detrimental. Chiang identified the sickness as a consequence of the absence of long-term planning, where the focus was solely on short-term profit and rampant corruption. For Chiang, the country was a "mentally retarded child of world culture" (Chiang 1921). Chiang's prescription was a heavy dose of education and wider readership, with a full recovery expected within twenty years. Much like Su Beng after him, Chiang's narrative of Taiwan history was strongly Han-centric, invoking an ancient lineage, much like other writers seeking to birth a modern nation-state. Chiang accentuated Taiwan's complicated history and called attention to a perceived lack of cultural wealth in Taiwan under the Qing and Japanese rule. Yet for Chiang and other like-minded Taiwan intellectuals, such as Lien Wen-ching and Tsai Pei-huo, this calling was anticolonial and, more importantly, Taiwanese. They sought greater voice for Taiwan in the Japanese Diet (Chou Wan-yao 2015, 236–37).

During a period of significant transformation, Chiang Wei-shui emerged as a prominent public intellectual in Taiwan. He diagnosed the nation as afflicted by moral decay and corrupt humanity, expressing the horrors and existential angst of the early twentieth century. It is crucial to consider the

transnational and historical dimensions of the nation-body metaphor in order to comprehend the global significance of the emergence of the modern Taiwanese nation-state and the existentialism inherent in its contemporary state. The tale revolves around a public intellectual—a doctor—during the transition of the long nineteenth century.

Albert Camus once wrote that "an intellectual is someone whose mind watches itself," who both watches and is watched. Intellectuals reflect on the reality of society and engage critically in a quest for solutions to its ailments. The connections among intellectual histories of the world are most evident in the lives of notable people who figure in national history. One pervasive influence on national historiography has been nationalism.

The existential attitude, or *authenticity* according to Camus, begins with a sense of disorientation, confusion, and dread in an apparently *absurd* or meaningless world. For many the First World War reflected a darkness in which the appalling capabilities of humankind became real. This modern world, a world of industry, migration, and citizenship, also featured militarism, class conflict, gender hierarchy, and imperialism. The mechanized killing of millions during the First World War led many intellectuals to question notions of the self and the limits of human capabilities. Mankind had demonstrated that it had the ability to act on specific notions of consciousness, including radical freedom. The very idea of radical freedom spooked people. The ability to realize the extent of one's freedom became what Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger called angst (Bakewell 2016, 154). Intellectuals used this notion of angst to philosophize their existence within contemporary society.

This absence of being—or of having—proved important in how intellectuals made sense of the global realities born out of the fractures of the First World War. There was a clear and direct link to the idea of an existential crisis. The existentialism of Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, and the three young philosophers—Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Raymond Aron—who frequently sat in the Bec-de-Gaz bar on the rue du Montparnasse in Paris drinking apricot cocktails at the turn of 1933, was not limited to European philosophy. In fact, much of the philosophy written during this period had radical existential undertones. In Taiwan, Chiang Wei-shui contextualized the international situation through the lens of existentialism and applied this to early thoughts of Taiwan as a nation in

and of itself. Events in China, although disconnected from Taiwan, would influence intellectual thought leading to what Chou Wen-yao refers to as a "cultural enlightenment movement" that would see Chiang Wei-shui, Lin Hsien-tang, and others establish the Taiwan Cultural Association (Taiwan Wenhua Xiehui; Chou Wan-yao 2015, 231).

On 4 May 1919, students from thirteen colleges in Beijing listened attentively to speeches being made in protest as China shamefully accepted the Paris Peace Conference settlement. The former German colonies in Shandong, rather than being returned to China, would instead be handed over to Japan (Mitter 2004, 3). Shortly after two o'clock the students congregated in the diplomatic quarter demanding justice. Lasting no more than a couple of hours, the sequence of events would become an important marker in modern Chinese history (Harper 2020, 352). The upsurge of nationalism that followed shifted toward a populist base and away from intellectual-led cultural activities. The May Fourth Movement encompasses the period from 1915 to 1921 and is also known as the New Cultural Movement (Xinwenhua Yundong). However, it's important to note that the artistic movements of that time had little connection to the nationalistic demonstration that the name suggests.

The two main centers of activity were Beijing, home to Peking and Tsinghua Universities, and Shanghai, where much of the publishing sector was located. The intellectual circles of the movement centered on Peking University, where Cai Yuanpei became chancellor and Chen Duxiu was dean. In 1915 Chen founded *La Jeunesse* journal (*New Youth;* Xin qinqnian) in Shanghai. The journal would later draw inspiration from the 1917 October Revolution in Russia and become an important mouthpiece for Marxism. Its editorial pieces emphasized the new vernacular literature (*baihua*) and social rebellion against established society and Confucian values. The explosive output of literature, due in part to the substantial literary establishment, including literary societies and publishing houses, saw many of its writers become famous. Among them was Lu Xun.

The intellectual circles in Beijing and Shanghai, and the literary societies that accompanied them during this period, were not unique. The power of coffee shops and teahouses as sites of intellectual exchange transcended cultural boundaries. These spaces fostered exchange, communication, sociality, and perhaps most importantly, creativity. They became the main

arena where news was created and consumed (Cowan 2005, 172) These political spaces brought together like-minded people and divided others in a regularized manner. They were, as described by the philosopher Jürgen Habermas, a public sphere, a space for an imaginary community, a "theatre in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk" (Fraser 1990, 57). The site of exchange, or the bourgeois public sphere (*Öffentlichkeit*), took form as a result of specific historical circumstances as a new form of civic society emerged, driven by growing rates of literacy and new forms of critical journalism. Habermas identified the discursive arena as an important institutional criterion in the emergence of a new public sphere. This new public sphere includes coffee houses in Britain, salons in France, *Tischgesellschaften* in Germany, and teahouses and restaurants in East Asia. Although differing in size, discussion, and composition, all brought together people who shared common concerns (Habermas 1989, 36). Following the end of the First World War, those concerns transcended boundaries.

At two o'clock on 1 March 1919 at the Taehwagwan Restaurant in Seoul, Korea, this aspect of Japanese colonialism was called into question. There twenty-two activists—the core of the March First (Sam-il) movement—read out the Korean Declaration of Independence. Inspired by Wilsonian ideals of self-determination, crowds assembled in Pagoda Park to hear student activist Chung Jae-yong read out the declaration that had been drawn up by historian Choe Nam-seon earlier that day in a restaurant in Insa-dong, Seoul (Hwang 2017, 140). As the crowd grew, Japanese residents of Seoul panicked. Violence ensued, resulting in the massacre of several Korean civilians. Subsequent events provided the catalyst for the Korean Independence Movement and would inspire other movements of resistance in the Japanese Empire.

In Taiwan, during the twenty-odd years since the start of the Japanese colonial period, armed resistance to the Japanese, such as that following the Beipu Incident of 1907 and the Tapani Incident of 1915, had, for the most part, been replaced in urban centers by more peaceful forms of political and cultural activism. The fallout of the Sam-il Movement (K. Samil Undong) would reverberate beyond the borders of the Korean Peninsula and would kindle thoughts of independence for the Taiwanese, especially those studying in Japan. As a result, Japan would prove to be not only

a hub of advanced learning for the Taiwanese elite but a place to study revolutionary ideas that were born out of that fateful day in Paris in 1919. Taiwanese intellectuals in Japan petitioned the Japanese government to permit representation for Taiwanese people modeled on the Irish Home Rule Movement. The Petition for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament committee was formed in 1921 and led by Lin Hsien-tang (Huang Deshi 1965). In Taiwan, on 17 October 1921 in Dadaocheng—a hub of social and political reform in northern Taiwan during the nineteenth century—the Taiwanese Cultural Association was founded by Chiang Wei-shui and Lin Hsien-tang.

Born in Yilan on 6 August 1890, Chiang Wei-shui had an older brother and a sister who was given away as a *sim-pū-á* (*tongyangxi*; a preadolescent girl adopted for future marriage). His younger brother, Chiang Wei-chuan, would, like Wei-shui, become a public intellectual. His daughter was killed in the 228 Incident, and his son was badly injured (Kao 2016). Chiang Wei-chuan had joined the KMT shortly after the Nationalists arrived in 1945, and after the events of February 1947, he was put in charge of the February 28th Incident Handling Committee. Chen Yi gave him responsibility for broadcasting to the Taiwanese on behalf of the government.

The Chiang family was poor. The father, Chiang Hong-zhang, was a fortune teller who worked outside the Chenghuang Temple (Chenghuang Miao) in Yilan. Most of his income went to feeding his opium addiction, leaving very little to feed the family. When Chiang Wei-shui was four years old, the family adopted their own *sim-pū-á*, Shih You, as a future wife for him. At ten, he began studying under the tutelage of Zhang Jingguang, a Confucian scholar. In 1915, Chiang Wei-shui graduated from the Taiwan Medical College (present-day National Taiwan University College of Medicine), and in 1919 he took Chen Tian (Chen Jingwen), a Taiwanese geisha and later political activist, as his concubine. The political center of their activism was Dadaocheng.

Dadaocheng's history is linked to a Quanzhou immigrant who moved to the area in 1851. After arriving from Keelung, Lin Lantian constructed three properties and converted them into the earliest known retail establish-

ments in Dadaocheng (Alsford 2019a, 123). Two years later, conflict broke out between members of the Quanzhou Sanyi clan and the Quanzhou Tongan clan in Banka. The Tongan clan lost and was forced to leave the area. In Dadaocheng, they built new houses and temples along the riverside, and soon a new market was formed. As clan-based violence plagued settler communities in northern Taiwan, the losers were banished from their districts and settled in Dadaocheng. Dadaocheng became particularly tolerant of people of different clans and ethnic groups. It was more resilient in accommodating the arrival of foreign merchants, following the opening of Tamsui harbor as a treaty port in 1862, than its neighbor and competitor, Banka. This is particularly evident in the census of 1898, in which the population of Dadaocheng (31,533) overshadowed Banka (23,767; Alsford 2019a, 123).

The initial survey carried out by the Japanese in 1897 clearly demonstrates that the streets of Dadaocheng were highly diverse. Houses along Jianchang Street, Qianqiu Street, Liuguan Street, and Jianchang Back Street all had a mix of foreign and local residents. In 1885, the district was given special administrative status, and one of the four tax offices on the island was located there. The establishment of the tax office followed the arrival of several foreign companies partnered with international commercial banks. The British trading company Cass and Company, for example, represented Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Cooperation, Tait and Company, the Bank of England, Jardine Matheson and Company, and the Japanese Yokohama Specie Bank (Alsford 2018, 144). This interconnectivity between Taiwanese local spaces and the international market made Dadaocheng a prime location for the Taiwan gentry to engage in trade.

The cosmopolitanism of the district and the mixing of cultures became a canvas for the first group of Taiwanese Western-style artists, including Ni Jianghui, who was recognized as the first, Yang Sanlang, and Lan Yinding, a famous watercolorist. To train the next generation of artists, they established the Research Institute of Painting (Huihua Yanjiusuo), funded by Ni Jianghui, as an ersatz art school in Dadaocheng. Under the reforms initiated by Liu Mingchuan, the first provincial governor, success in business led to increased social mobility, and in Dadaocheng, the city's diversity allowed for the emergence of a new urban elite.

Dadaocheng was globally situated in the period of uncertainty that followed the day of discontent in 1919. Through a network of connections, numerous Taiwanese individuals were able to transmit influence and patronage. This networking played a crucial role in the development of a Taiwanese identity. Interurban links among Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and Shanghai facilitated a flow of ideas and people, leading to the formation of new networks.

Chiang Wei-shui established Taian Hospital (Daan Yiyuan) in Dadaocheng, which served as a gathering place for Taiwanese intellectuals to engage in discussions, debates, and political planning. In 1920, this assembly of intellectuals aimed to establish a Taiwan Assembly, and the subsequent year, Chiang played a significant role in the formation of the Taiwanese Cultural Association (TCA). His activism led to imprisonment in 1923 and again in 1925. In 1927, the TCA split along ideological lines. Chiang advocated for unity by founding the Taiwanese People's Party, the first legal political party established in Taiwan. The party's political philosophy was rooted in Sun Yat-sen's *Three Principles of the People*. As a result, Chiang's legacy has been subject to dualistic interpretations within present-day political divides in Taiwan.

Public intellectuals such as Chiang were not always in agreement on what constituted a Taiwanese national consciousness. What is more, they differed on the correct pathway for Taiwan. Li Ye-Isi, the grandson of Li Chungsheng, the protagonist of the following tale, was among those who opposed damaging the relationship between Taiwan and colonial Japan and instead advocated for closer integration.

15

A Philanthropist's Tale

LI CHUNSHENG

Are we Chinese Christians uniquely denied of the joyful choice of building our own Church?

LI CHUNSHENG · 1875

Following the First World War, a global period of intellectual uncertainty had an impact on Taiwan, leading it to be described as the "marginal man," a term used by sociological theorists Robert Ezra Park (1950) and Everett Stonequist (1937). This concept highlights the state of being suspended between two cultural realities. Taiwan grappled with the challenge of establishing its identity during this period. Drawing inspiration from civil rights activist W. E. B. Du Bois and his semi-autoethnographic work on the African American experience, *The Souls of Black Folk* (1994), Taiwanese intellectuals framed their identity with a sense of double consciousness, constantly viewing themselves through the perspectives of others. In return, they drew on a sense of plurality that permeated their writings, their paintings, and their poetry. Chiang Wei-shui encapsulated this in his desire to place Taiwan within an ancient lineage that many felt it simply no longer belonged to. Taiwan's marginality consisted of not just two refractory

cultures, but many, some of which were melted in while others were either partially or fully fused. One united aspect in the intellectual thought of this period was Sartre's notion of that which "blares out loud and clear: the Absence"—the "not being." The tale of marginality continues here, and Dadaocheng once again provides the backdrop.

As noted in Chiang Wei-shui's story, the history of Dadaocheng is one of migration and partial exile. The people who would build its markets, construct its temples and churches, fund the paving of its streets, and design its buildings had mostly been banished from neighboring towns and farmsteads. Dadaocheng featured both economic and political centrality and social and cultural marginality. It provided a canvas onto which newcomers painted their existence. Nonetheless, what was written, painted, and spoken was not always conciliatory. Some wished to merge their double self with their colonial overlords; some sought to readdress an ancient, imagined lineage; others hoped that there would be no loss to their older selves while having no wish to become colonial subjects; and some wished to emulate the West. This might take the form of architectural inspiration (as seen in the shophouses) or in theology, namely Christian thought. The fusion of peoples and cultures led to new and hybrid intellectual forms. In Taiwan, Li Chunsheng encapsulates this in his intellectual struggle with multiple systems of thought.

Born in poverty in Xiamen on the Fujian coast on 12 January 1838, Li Chunsheng grew up to be an influential comprador, a trading middleman, and a successful trader in his own right after migrating to Taiwan at the age of twenty-six (Alsford 2010a, 309). His father, Li Desheng, was a boatman. In 1851, Li Chunsheng, like his father, converted to Christianity. He learned to speak and read English, and at twenty he joined the British trading company Boyd and Company. In 1864, under the direction of another British company, Elles and Company, he would join John Dodd as a comprador, helping him establish Dodd and Company, which he would inherit on Dodd's departure from Taiwan in 1890, though by that time it was worthless (Tu 1963). Li was instrumental in helping Dodd develop the tea industry in Taiwan. The trade of various goods, such as camphor, coal,

rice, and tea, by Dodd and Company led to notable changes in population patterns. As economic demographics shifted with this trade, a significant number of merchants relocated north from the previous capital of Tainan to seize the emerging opportunities for profitability. In 1887, Taiwan became a province of the Manchu Empire. Its first governor, Liu Mingchuan, oversaw construction projects that were both public and private. This included the development of Dadaocheng beyond the North Gate of the walled city. Liu asked Li and Lin Weiyuan to combine their efforts and develop Qianjiu and Jiangchang Streets with Western-style shophouses for foreign trading companies. Li proposed to Liu that a railway be built between Dadaocheng and Keelung, and work began in 1887. In 1890, Li was made director of the Taiwan Silk Industry Bureau.

As a result of his contribution to the development of industry in Taiwan, in particular the construction of the walled city, he was awarded the title *tongzhi* (subprefect). *The History of Taiwan* (Taiwan tongshi) by Lien Heng (1878–1936) places Li Chunsheng alongside Ku Hsien-jung, Chen Fuqian, and Huang Nanqiu as the most successful businessmen in Taiwan (Huang Fu-san 2004). In 1895, prior to the Japanese attack on Taipei, he joined Bai Longfa and other leading figures to greet the Japanese as they entered the city in an effort to avoid conflict and destruction of property (Alsford 2018, 175).

Li was not just astute in business; he was also an intellectual, particularly versed in Christian theology. During his lifetime, he authored twelve books, including a collection of essays (1894), a travelogue (1896), two books on religious conflict in China (1903, 1906), three theological tracts (1907, 1908, 1911), and a bible commentary (1914). Li wrote broadly, crossing various subject areas. It was, however, in theology that he made his most significant contribution to public intellectual thought in Taiwan at the turn of the twentieth century. Li wrote some of the earliest Chinese Christian commentary in Taiwan in the period following the arrival of the Presbyterian Church in the 1860s. He was respectfully critical of how missionaries had misrepresented Christianity in China. Specifically, he criticized the rendering of biblical vocabulary into written Chinese, and thus unknowingly prepared the foundations for the eventual nativization of the church in Taiwan. Although Li and his family had a positive relationship with

Japanese colonial authorities, he never learned Japanese. His vision for a native church thus was framed in sinocentric terms.

Central to his thought was the idea that Christianity was a lost religion of China. His grafting of Christianity onto Chinese cultural elements toned down its foreignness (Ya-pei Kuo 2017, 44). He followed the Italian Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) in presenting Christian doctrine that reinforced the teachings of Confucianism. Li utilized the cultural capital of Confucianism in his apologetics for Christian theology, arguing that the spread of Christianity in China had been slowed by Western missionaries' poor translation of Christian scriptures, compounded by discrepancies between versions made by different Christian denominations, which raised suspicion. Li proposed that all churches and chapels should be declared "the sacred palace of the High God who created the world" (*zhuzai zaohua Shangdi sheng dian*) and that all places of teaching should have the following over the entrance: Tandao Yimen (Entry Door to the Heavenly Way; Ya-pei Kuo 2017, 47).

Li moved away from the foreign mission enterprise (but not from Christianity) as he refined and published his thought. His growing awareness of his own suspension between two cultural realities came to the fore in a conversation about the implementation of a "self-supporting church" (*zili jiaohui*). Li's frugality, a result of his faith, caused him to be marginalized by other successful merchants, such as Lin Hsiung-cheng, who were known to display wealth. This left Li outside certain elite circles. Yet despite this "absence," the first Japanese governor, Kabayama Sukenori, invited Li, then fifty-seven, to assist the colonial government. Li subsequently transferred his businesses to his sons to focus on political and social affairs.

Prior to the arrival of the Japanese, there were numerous institutions for social care in Taiwan. During the Japanese colonial period, many of these were reformed and regulated. Among those under Japanese control were institutions for the care of the disabled, the homeless, the elderly, and orphans. Taipei Renjiyuan, for example, was funded by the Banqiao Lin family in 1866, but was taken over by the colonial authorities in 1899. Over the course of the colonial period, the Japanese established seven care homes, twelve government-led organizations offering free medical treatment, and forty-three private organizations also offering free care (Lai 2008, 84).

The most prominent recipient of Li's philanthropy, beyond the church and associated organizations, was the Taipei Natural Foot Association (Taibei Tianranzu Hui), formed in 1900 by Dr. Huang Yujie in Dadaocheng. Huang was a traditional herbalist who frequently treated patients without charge and made a significant contribution during several epidemics, including the plague of 1896. He received his license as a herbal doctor—the first to receive one—from the Japanese government in 1897. Li joined Huang and forty-eight other elites to fund the association. This mutual aid association was largely a response to a much larger movement, the Foot Emancipation Society (Buchanzuhui), in China. The formation of such associations would inspire others, such as Lin Qingyue, who in 1919 established Hongji Hospital (Hongji Yiyuan) in Dadaocheng to treat social issues such as opium addiction (Alsford 2019a, 129).

An additional form of cooperative philanthropy occurred during the annual ritualized practice of Pudu (Universal Salvation Festival) to appease ghosts and the "restless" dead during the seventh month of the lunar year. These "ghosts" for the most part functioned as metaphors for the socially marginalized, paupers, beggars, and prostitutes—the *jianmin* (lit. "filthy people"; Weller 1985, 46). As part of the ceremony, ritualistic food was first offered to hungry ghosts but subsequently consumed by the poor (Wu Yingtao 1980, 24). The ceremony is colorfully described by George Leslie Mackay:

> The seventh month [of the lunar calendar] was the time for making offerings to all departed spirits. It was a time of great festivity and excitement. . . . Immense quantities of food [were] offered to the spirits. . . . When night came on and the time summoning the spirits approached [a] very unspiritual mob—thousands and thousands of hungry beggars, tramps, blacklegs, desperadoes of all sorts, from the country towns, the city slums . . . swelled in every part of the open space, impatiently waiting their turn. [When] the spirits were satisfied, and the gong was sounded, [this] was the signal for the mob. (Mackay 1896, 130)

Although violent cases of "food robbery" led Governor Liu Mingchuan to ban the festival in 1889, descriptions of the event elsewhere in China allude to the hunger and alms basis of the ceremony (Weller 1985, 50).

Widespread income disparity, resulting from commercialization and the rise of the urban middle class, brought systematic attempts to alleviate poverty and associated social issues. One example involved the *yutingtang*, or orphanages. Most children admitted were girls, and the largest institution in northern Taiwan was the Taipei Jen-Chi Relief Institution (Renjiyuan), established in 1870 by Li Chunsheng and Lien Chen-tung, the father of Lien Chan, a Taiwanese politician, on land donated by the Banqiao Lin family.

Among other notable philanthropists was the husband of Shimizu Teruko, Shih Chien, often referred to as the Father of Homeless People, who was born in Tamsui in 1899. After graduating from Taihoku Industrial School (J. Taihoku Kōgyō Gakkō) in 1923, he funded Aiailiao, a hostel for homeless people, in Banka. Shih wrote on the plight of homelessness (Shih Chien 1925). In 1926, he established the Association for the Care of Homeless People (Qigai Pumie Xiehui). He invited thirty-six social elites of Taiwan to join the committee, among them wealthy merchants, such as Lin Hsiung-cheng and Ku Hsien-jung. Li Chunsheng had died two years earlier so was not part of that committee. His earlier philanthropy provided important foundations for the establishment of the later charitable organizations in the region.

Li financed the construction of two churches, Jinan Presbyterian Church in 1897 and Dadaocheng Presbyterian Church in 1915, when he was seventy-eight years old. Li was an evangelist dedicated to the spread of Chinese Christianity throughout Taiwan and China, as is clear in his published writing in Fuzhou.

Li did much to improve the lives of people in Taiwan, but he was unsuccessful in mobilizing large-scale conversion. For most Taiwanese, Christianity remained alien but not incompatible with their own culture. He was successful in partially fusing it with the identity of the district, but it would be another belief system born out of the West that would ultimately take hold: self-determining nationalism and democracy. These ideas continue to fuel Taiwanese sociopolitical thought.

Li Chunsheng was a marginal man. He features little in mission history of Taiwan. George Leslie Mackay and other foreign missionaries in northern Taiwan seldom refer to him in their diaries and correspondence. The history of philanthropy and charity equally marginalizes him. Fate

condemned him to live in the shadows of contrasting societies that were not merely different but culturally antagonistic. He was an ally of the "barbarians" or "the man empowered by the foreigners" (*fanshi lizaichun*). This providence of pluralness shaped all Taiwanese starting with the earlier layers of colonization, the departure of the Japanese at the end of the Second World War, and the events of February 1947, which in turn fractured this dialectal subjectivity and forced many to choose a side.

THE 228 INCIDENT

1947

16

A Hawker's Tale

LIN CHIANG-MAI

The lights on the street were coming up,
and people—artists, writers, actors—the types who
would drink, smoke, and laugh their way through
the end of the world—drifted out of the teahouse.
Often, they stopped at the widow's stand. She even
sold American cigarettes. They tore open the pack right
there, lighting up with a match she gave them.
SHAWNA YANG RYAN · 2016

As Emperor Hirohito read out the declaration of surrender on 15 August 1945, his words would trigger one of the most significant movements of people in the Asia Pacific: "After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in our Empire today, we have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure. We have ordered our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union that our Empire accepts the provisions of their joint declaration."

Chen Yi, the Chinese Nationalist–appointed chief executive, arrived on 24 October 1945 at the port of Keelung in the north of Taiwan, to govern the island as provincial head for the Republic of China. It was the first time Taiwan would be governed as a part of a modern Chinese republic.

As for the Japanese, many who had settled and made Taiwan their home were now forced to leave as a condition of that surrender. In turn, many others began arriving from China. These exoduses would mark Taiwan. The harbors of Keelung and Kaohsiung became crammed, and ferries started to move people and their belongings to and from the island. This movement ushered in an era of placelessness in which the sense of belonging became liminal and uncertain.

At the start, many of Taiwan's inhabitants were enthusiastic about, or at least interested in, this idea of a returning to a motherland. The expectation of the end of the empire triggered expectations of greater equality and participation in society and politics. Within a very short period, these expectations were met with disappointment. Taiwan under Chinese sovereignty was not what many had expected. Incompetence and corruption were rife, and many were dismayed by the physical state of the arriving troops. Soldiers disembarked at ports without full uniform, some without shoes. Many carried nonmilitary equipment: kitchen utensils and other sundry goods. The local inhabitants keen to see "the army that had defeated the Japanese," as propaganda leaflets claimed, were shocked. They were unable to stop comparing these arrivals with the smartly dressed Japanese departures. Some Taiwanese rationalized that these soldiers had been fighting for several years. Yet as more Chinese soldiers arrived and began filtering into urban areas, the behavior of many would sour the opinions of their supporters.

As tensions heightened, the situation gave rise to the expression "Out with the dogs and in with the pigs" (*Gouqu zhulai*), solidifying a new layer of coloniality on Taiwan as a colonization in exile. The signifier of this was the creation of two distinct groups of "ethnicities": the *benshengren* and the *waishengren*. These distinctions have defined Taiwanese nation-building processes.

For the *benshengren*, during the fifty years of Japanese colonization, Taiwan had experienced significant economic development and an increased standard of living. By swiftly confiscating five hundred Japanese-owned factories, mines, and former homes of Japanese residents, Chen Yi quickly consolidated his governance over Taiwan. Hopes of greater equality among the Taiwanese were dashed, and Chen Yi earned the moniker *jieshou* (robber). With the confiscation of property, the Chinese government, like the Japanese before them, now had a monopoly over key industries and began handing their management to the business tycoons and technocrats arriving from China. Taiwanese discontent grew rapidly, and economic mismanagement led to a large black market, heightened inflation, and food shortages. Many of those arriving from China made punitive demands on local Taiwanese businesses, asking for either a significant discount on products or, in some cases, free items. For many in Taiwan, the incoming Chinese nationalists were erasing successes they had achieved during the colonial period, especially in self-government.

Between the end of 1945 and early 1947, Taiwan was a whistling kettle. The boiling point occurred on the evening of the 27 February 1947, when a Tobacco Monopoly Bureau enforcement team in Taipei went to the district of Dadaocheng and confiscated "contraband" cigarettes from Lin Chiang-mai, a forty-year-old widow, outside the Tianma Tea House (Tianma Chafang).

Taiwan's political reality and the historiographic divisions in the postwar period have left us with a fractured view of the background of Lin Chiang-mai, the "silent mother of the 228 Incident." Piecing together her biography has not been easy. Lin is thought to have been born in 1907 in Hsinchu County. At the time of the incident she resided at 9 Erdingmu, Rixinding, in Dadaocheng. Her two older sons had been left in Taoyuan with her father-in-law while she lived in Taipei with her other two children. At the time of the incident, Lin's youngest son, Lin Wen-shan, was twelve, and her only daughter, Lin Ming-chu, was ten. She had been widowed since before the birth of her last child.

According to the official report filed by the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau in 1947, Lin claimed that when she pleaded with the enforcement team to return her stock, a man hit her on the head with the butt of his gun. As observers descended onto the scene, in the chaos, she could not remember the attacker's appearance. However, she was certain that the Tobacco Monopoly Bureau enforcement team was responsible, as the agents had taken all her cigarettes (National Archives Administration 1947). She claimed that she had begged but they simply ignored her. She

stated in her record that she would like the bureau to return her cigarettes. When the investigator asked her what language was spoken during the incident, Lin said that it was all done in the "local language," giving no indication that there had been any language barrier (National Archives Administration 1947).

In 2006, the writer Yang Du produced a documentary, *Looking for the Silent Mother of the 228 Incident* (Xunzhao ererba de chenmo muqin). In the documentary, Yang interviewed Lin's daughter, Lin Ming-chu. Yang pointed out that Lin Ming-chu had later married a *waishengren* and that the daughter was a witness to the incident, arguing that Lin Chiang-mai's "misfortune" was simply a misunderstanding caused by a language barrier as opposed to *waishengren* mistreatment of *benshengren*. The documentary was funded by Taipei City's Department of Cultural Affairs, whose mayor at the time was Ma Ying-jeou, the later KMT president. Moreover, Yang had declared himself a KMT supporter (Chen Hsiao-I et al. 2007).

Yang presents Lin Chiang-mai as a neatly dressed widow who never wore "Taiwanese outfits" but rather an eloquent *qipao* (cheongsam). He asserts that Lin often told her daughter, "We are not trying to look glamorous, only to be neat and presentable. It doesn't matter if we are poor. People would respect you as long as you look presentable" (Yang Tu 2015). He explains that Lin made her living by selling cigarettes, that she was highly noticeable when working the streets, and that bodyguards from restaurants and clubs felt sorry for her and often purchased cigarettes from her. He claims that Lin Ming-chu did not attend school but rather helped her mother on the streets. She was thus present and witnessed the whole incident.

Lin Ming-chu states in the interview:

> On the evening of 27 February 1947, Mum was selling cigarettes as usual. I was holding a tray of cigarettes close by. A soldier-looking man came over, picked up a cigarette and lit it. He didn't pay at first, so people started to stare at him. He then put his hand into his pocket. I thought he was going to get his money, but a bodyguard next to me thought he was taking out a gun, so he started to shout, "What's the man doing?" in Hokkien. Since everyone was speaking in Hokkien, the soldier couldn't understand and got nervous. He thought people were going to hurt him. He left the money and escaped. Shortly after, a car came with six or seven police and things got out of hand. Many other cigarette sellers ran away. Mum was unable to run because she was wearing a *qipao*, and I was too young to escape. Soon mum was attacked and people around me got furious. (Yang Tu 2015)

Yang's documentary caused a controversy in the reactions from victims of the 228 Incident and the White Terror that followed. One of those involved was Juan Mei-shu. Juan was nineteen at the time of the incident and had lost her father, a Taiwanese elite who fell victim to the White Terror. Juan started to investigate the 228 Incident in the 1960s and was viewed as one of the leading figures for revealing the truth behind the story (Juan 1994).

Juan's reaction to Yang Du's documentary was published in the *Liberty Times* on 9 February 2007 as an opinion piece titled "The Truths and Lies of Lin Chiang-mai" (Lin Jiangmai de zhenzhen jiajia; Juan 2007). Juan argues that the documentary seriously twisted the truth and that many of Lin Ming-chu's statements were misleading. Juan claims that Ming-chu told a very different story when she discussed the incident with her in the past. Her own investigation concluded that Lin Ming-chu was not out with her mother that evening, as she was not even in Taipei. According to Juan, it was Lin Chiang-mai's third and fourth sons who were out helping her that night. Various witnesses, including Li Hsien-wen, Huang Shou-li and Wang Kuei-jung, were all present that night and all told Juan that they had not seen a little girl with Lin. Wang Kuei-jung's account is particularly important, as he was selling cigarettes next to Lin Chiang-mai.

Juan writes:

> I first approached Lin Ming-chu back in 2001. She told me that she wasn't at the scene as she was too young. As a result, she had very few details. Later in the interview she told me to go and speak to her older brother, Lin Pao-lo. However, she stressed that I must not tell her brother that she gave me his contact details. I didn't think much about it then. It wasn't until later that I found out that Lin Pao-lo has a deep hatred toward the *waishengren* and since Lin Ming-chu had married a *waishengren* there was resentment. Later, I became a

good friend with Lin Pao-lo and he agreed to be interviewed for the documentaries that I produced. He was in his seventies when he was interviewed, and he was in good health. Some people from Taoyuan had told me that the Department of Cultural Affairs intend to build a road that leads to Lin Chiang-mai's grave, and her grave will become a cultural monument. Many local people objected to this idea. Lin doesn't need to be apotheosized! Lin was one of the victims during the 228 Incident, but what about the other mothers, wives, and of the many other victims? Who is using Lin to make up a new story? How can the Department of Cultural Affairs make it up to the other victims?

The premise of Juan's argument is that Lin Chiang-mai was not the trigger for the 228 Incident. She was a symptom, the affront that lit the powder barrel. For Juan, the causes of the incident were social and economic. However, authors such as Tsai Hui-ping (2006 argue that the 228 Incident was caused by a language barrier. For Tsai, this claim comes from repeated interviews in which Ming-chu emphasized the difficulty of her mother's life. She says her father had died before she was born, and her mother had to live with her husband's large family. According to Ming-chu, Lin Chiang-mai was bullied by her sisters-in-law, and as a result, she left Taoyuan. She first lived with her parents-in-law, who ran a tea shop in Taipei. After the tea shop closed, she started to sell cigarettes around Dadaocheng. On the night that Lin Ming-chu claimed she was helping her mother, the soldier who tried to ask the price of the cigarette spoke in Mandarin. She did not understand him as she spoke only Japanese and Hokkien. Before she could react, some local gangsters started to shout, "Someone's not paying for the cigarette!" Soon people went up to the soldier, and the situation deteriorated because people could not communicate.

United Daily, which published Tsai's article, is a pan-blue paper, generally supporting the KMT, whereas the *Liberty Times*, which published Juan's opinion piece, is a pan-green paper, affiliated with the DPP. The political cleavages in Taiwan make understanding the history of Lin Chiang-mai's cigarette incident difficult. Tsai's argument is that although the 228 Incident is often associated with the conflict between *waishengren* and *benshengren*, Lin Chiang-mai allowed her only daughter to marry a *laoyuzai* (literally,

"old taro," indicating a *waishengren* male)—moreover, a *waishengren* police officer. For Tsai, this is a touching account of how the two ethnic groups integrated: "Lin Ming-chu feels that Taiwan should allow this sixty-year-old wound to heal" (Tsai Hui-ping 2006). This stands in stark contrast to other victim and onlooker stories, which portray the history not as healing but rather as a continuation of the *waishengren* silencing of the *benshengren*.

Shawna Ryan, in her novel *Green Island*, highlights the confusion and panic that accompanied the incident:

> The cigarette vendor clutched her head. Her fingers were greasy with blood. Pain rippled through her skull in slow waves. She imagined she heard her children screaming in the chaos. The Monopoly Bureau agents, pressed to the widow's fallen body by the crowd rolling angrily toward them in a fog of cursing, kicked her. Eyes wild, the agents waved their guns and threatened to shoot, but the crowd's cries swallowed their words. The people would not retreat; some fought to get the bleeding cigarette vendor while others surged forward in rage. The agents began firing and the crowd collapsed, fleeing, breaking into hundred splinters. (Ryan 2016, 7)

George Kerr, who was in Taipei at the time of the incident, relates that the bureau agents, firing into the crowd, killed one person and left Lin Chiang-mai bleeding on the side of the street, close to death. The agents ran and hid in a nearby police box to wait for police to arrive. The crowd allowed the police to remove the agents but set fire to the bureau truck and its contents. The following morning, a crowd of at least two thousand marched, according to Kerr, carrying banners and placards that had been made overnight, to the office of the bureau chief, demanding the death sentence for the agents who had committed manslaughter the night before (Kerr 1966, 254). Finding the chief absent, they marched to the governor's office to present the petition directly to Chen Yi. According to Kerr, during the march, more agents were discovered abusing two children selling cigarettes. Kerr writes, "This was too much; an angry crowd beat the Chinese agents to death within a few feet of the Bureau Branch Office" (Kerr 1966, 255). Kerr, who was having lunch close to the scene, recalled hearing machine gun fire. Leaving the restaurant, he proceeded toward the Monopoly

Bureau, knowing that the protest was centered there. Finding it empty, he proceeded to the governor's office. There he saw the line of heavily armed Nationalist soldiers facing an unarmed crowd. On the roadway between them lay the bodies of civilians who had been shot down. This was now a massacre, not simply an incident.

Understanding the partisan divides behind the biography of Lin Chiang-mai does not change what is known about the events on 28 February. Lin Chiang-mai was given a permit to sell cigarettes, and thus she was not illegally hawking. Language would have been an issue. Many Taiwanese did not speak Mandarin. Hokkien and Japanese were the principal languages spoken, reinforcing the divide in nation-building processes. For the Taiwanese, the 228 Incident triggered their start-again nationalism. Their perception of the Japanese did not parallel that of people in postcolonial Korea and China. Lin did not die on the streets of Dadaocheng, but her health did decline following that evening. She died in 1969 at the age of sixty-four due to liver problems. Her legacy is a salient reminder of the complexities of identity in Taiwan.

17

A Refugee's Tale

JIN SU-QIN

Our optimism, indeed, is admirable,
even if we say so ourselves. The story of our struggle
has finally become known. We lost our home, which
means the familiarity of daily life. We lost our occupation,
which means the confidence that we are of some use in
this world. We lost our language, which means the
naturalness of reactions, the simplicity of gestures,
the unaffected expression of feelings.

HANNAH ARENDT · 1943

"There have always been refugees," writes Lyndsey Stonebridge in *Placeless People*, yet the mass movement of displacement is very much a product of the twentieth century (Stonebridge 2018, 3). Taiwan's identity is in many ways pockmarked by displacement. The scars of its twentieth-century definition are rooted in three significant mass displacements: (1) the displacement of Indigenous, Hakka, and Hokkien-speaking communities throughout the Japanese colonial period, (2) the displacement of many Japanese following their surrender at the end of the Second World War and the cession of Taiwan to the protectorate of the newly formed United Nations, and (3) the Chinese Nationalists who fled—along with their government-in-exile—to Taiwan after losing the civil war. Unlike many other twentieth-century mass displacements, these resulted not in a stateless people but rather in a stateless

nation. Many of those who came to Taiwan in the postwar period did not do so of their own volition but rather were forced there by the government that was becoming exiled (Dominic Yang 2021, 42).

The four years between 1945 and 1949 witnessed two significant displacements: the Japanese *from* Taiwan and the Chinese Nationalists *to* Taiwan. The crises of this period affected not simply the displaced people but also the political and moral authority of the Taiwanese nation-state—in particular, its historical claim. Taiwan's placelessness during this period was felt by all. Among the Japanese who had come to see Taiwan as home, some had put down roots on the island for almost five decades and had no knowledge of the Japanese metropolitan centers where they would have to reimagine their everyday lives (Dawley 2015, 115).

For the Taiwanese, this period ushered in the "silence"; for the arriving refugees, living in Taiwan was akin to homelessness (Joshua Fan 2011, 17). For all involved, the experience was both existential and political. The history of "China's homeless generation" begins with the perceived ineffectiveness of the Manchu Empire.

The Manchus' seeming lack of will to modernize in the face of continued foreign encroachment, coupled with rising modern Chinese nationalism, precipitated the overthrow of the last imperial dynasty in China. The 1911 Xinhai Revolution, named for the year in which it occurred, was followed by establishment of the Republic of China. Although there had been numerous anti-Qing rebellions and attempts to overthrow the dynasty, it was popular unrest over a railway crisis in Wuchang, Hubei, that directly led to the downfall of the Qing dynasty. On 10 October 1911, the New Army stationed at Wuchang launched an assault on the residence of the viceroy of Huguang. Ruicheng, the viceroy, abandoned the residence, and the revolutionaries shortly controlled the entire city. The Wuchang Uprising, as it would later be known, was not necessarily the catalyst that many of the revolutionary leaders had planned or hoped for. It took many of them by surprise. Sun Yat-sen, for example, was in the United States on a fundraising mission. Huang Xing and Song Jiaoren were hundreds of miles from Wuchang at the time of the incident. Following the successes in Hubei, the revolutionary leaders telegrammed the other provinces to secede from the Qing government. Eighteen provinces in Southern and Central China agreed. Sun returned to China in December 1911 and was elected

provisional president of the new republic. On 12 February 1912, Empress Dowager Longyu, on behalf of Emperor Puyi, abdicated the Qing throne, marking a new chapter in modern Chinese history.

In Taiwan, the period between October 1911 and January 1912 was unremarkable. Taiwan was a growing part of the Japanese empire, and although some in the literary elite were following events in China, the spirit of Chinese nationalism was markedly absent. Liang Qichao, a Chinese reformist, had visited the island earlier that year, but his meetings were always held privately in specific literary circles. The seismic events unfolding in China were not part of the daily lives of ordinary citizens. This was undoubtedly true for vast swaths of the population in China also. The elites' ability to spawn a movement that could begin consolidating notions of identity in China arguably grew out of the student protests in Beijing on 4 May 1919. The growing anger among the students centered largely on the government's weak response to the Treaty of Versailles, which allowed Japan to retain territories in Shandong that Germany had surrendered following the siege of Tsingtao in 1914. The demonstrations ignited protests across major urban areas in China and an upsurge in Chinese nationalism that revealed a mass base far from traditional intellectual and political elites. Thus began the New Cultural Movement in 1915–21, which criticized classical Chinese ideals in an attempt to attract a new Chinese cultural base that would see China as a nation among other nations, a society that was forward facing and not past dependent.

The New Cultural Movement was wholly Chinese, and although it registered in some overseas Chinese communities and among certain literary elites in Taiwan, the significant developments took place among literary circles and student organizations in Beijing and Shanghai. Key members, such as Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, became frustrated by the slowness of change and urged more radical social action. The political left would become a natural home as theories of anti-imperialism were discussed, translated, and shared. Chen and Li used their positions as faculty members at Peking University to actively assist in organizing Marxist study groups, which eventually evolved into the initial gatherings of the Chinese Communist Party. One of the participants in the inaugural meeting was a young and ambitious individual who had worked as one of Chen's library assistants. That man was Mao Zedong (Harper 2020, 353).

The rupture in political thought of the early revolutionary leaders led to decades-long uncertainties in the country as the republic fought for control of the country against militaristic warlord factions and communist insurgencies. Japan used this instability to expand its influence and secure direct access to raw materials. An explosion on the railway in Shenyang (Mukden in Manchu) on 18 September 1931 would change China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, who had become the leader of the republic following Sun's death in 1925. The explosion triggered a Japanese military response to protect Japanese lives and property. The Mukden Incident sparked the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Japan was successful in supporting and creating Manchukuo, a puppet state led by the last Qing emperor, Puyi. Between 1931 and 1937, Japan and China clashed in a series of incidents. On the night of 7 July 1937, in Wanping, a village fifteen kilometers southwest of Beijing, Japanese and Chinese troops exchanged fire close to the Marco Polo Bridge—named after the Venetian explorer but known in Chinese as Lugouqiao. The unfortunate bridge later gave its name to the incident, which not only triggered Japan's full-scale invasion of China but would define the destinies of multiple nations.

Early twentieth-century China was a period of mixed relations with Japan. The year 1937, although a watershed moment in the clash between the two, was not a starting point. Revolutionary leaders keen to escape the clutches of the Qing empire used Japan not only as a model but also as a refuge. Whether positive or negative, a significant part of twentieth-century China was shaped by Japan (Mitter 2014, 27). Japan's growing strength led many Chinese intellectuals to look toward the West as an answer to the crisis that enveloped China at the turn of the century.

In 1924, in a speech in Kobe, Japan, Sun Yat-sen declared that the peoples of Asia had "shaken off the yoke of European oppression," and Japan had shown what could be done by its victory over Russia in 1905. Sun emphasized his understanding of the meaning of pan-Asianism. In Japan, this was interpreted not as cooperation but as competition.

Sun's political philosophy, the Three Principles of the People—democracy, nationalism, and livelihood—shaped the discourse of competing nationalisms in China. The fight for the heart of the nation between the Kuomintang-led government of the Republic of China and the Communist Party of China flared intermittently between 1927 and 1949. Typically

understood as a conflict in two acts, the first act ended with the outbreak of war with Japan, and the second act opened following the Japanese defeat in the War of the Pacific. In 1949, the Communists were successful in gaining control over the Chinese mainland, establishing the People's Republic of China in 1949. The Republic of China fled, setting up a government-in-exile on Taiwan.

The great divide between the Nationalists and the Communists is not a straightforward story of losers and winners. The divide was fractured, uneven. Many people were caught up in the struggle, accidents of history; others made their decisions of their own free will. Some families were forever divided. The "Great Exodus," to use a term coined by Dominic Yang, was traumatic and identity-forming (Dominic Yang 2021, 1). This exodus informs Taiwan. What Taiwan is and what it is not trace their history to this juncture. Taiwan is defined by the stories of its displacements; it is an island of migration. Most who fled China were neither military or bureaucratic elites nor influential business elites. They were common folk and petty civil servants (Dominic Yang 2021, 7). They came, not always willingly, from a multitude of provinces with distinct environments, identities, customs, and languages. In Taiwan, they would be labeled collectively outsiders and confronted by others coming from different environments, with divergent identities, customs, and languages, now referred to as insiders. This cultural blending made for a uniquely Taiwan experience.

The following tale is of a woman who was both a colonist and a refugee: a placeless person who, despite making Taiwan her home, had a secret that continued to tie her to her memory of her birthplace.

Jin Su-qin was born in 1925, she thinks. The date is based on her own estimation. She was born in Xiatang village, Lingjing Township, Linhai County, Zhejiang, China. It is hard to locate her hometown precisely, since Lingjing Township was abolished in 2001 and now forms part of the current Hetou Town. It is in a mountainous area approximately 140 kilometers south of Ningbo (Alsford 2010b).

Jin's family was not poor, but neither could it claim to be rich. They owned enough land to maintain a comfortable living, and following Jin's

father's passing, her mother hired tenant farmers to work the land. The distribution of tenured farming varied depending on the type of farming, soil condition, and general economic environment. Given that 95 percent of farming communities in the areas surrounding Shanghai (including Zhejiang) were said to be tenanted, any land ownership would have been historical and have remained within families for multiple generations (Tawney 1932, 34). In nineteenth- and early twentieth-century China, landowning, although less profitable than trading and moneylending, was much more reliable, dignified, and considered more honest. As an investment, land was more durable and carried lower risk. Moreover, it did not carry the same stigma as other profit-making enterprises, and if landlords did not make unnecessary demands, the relationship between tenant and landlord was respectful (Zhou 2013). Landownership provided a solid foundation for the financial well-being of families. It secured household income and granted the necessary propriety for family ritual practice.

In early twentieth-century China, one such ritual practice was wrapping the feet of young girls to modify their shape and size. Although the Republic of China had banned the practice of foot binding in 1912, the ban was not enforced. Jin's mother attempted to bind her feet at a young age. Jin resisted, untying the bandages at night after her mother had gone to bed (Alsford 2010b). This continued for a while until her mother threatened that Jin would have to help on the farm if she continued to refuse. Jin happily accepted this proposal and began to learn the trades that would become important to her later in life.

Changes to everyday life in China began piecemeal following the beginnings of the republic. In many locations, especially rural areas, this took decades. One practice the republic considered important was elections. According to the Chinese-British writer Jung Chang, people in China did not seem to find the idea of voting alien. Competition as a route to high office was deeply ingrained in Chinese culture. After all, the political elites were selected via nationwide examination (Jung Chang 2019, 65). Men who had either a middle-school education or large property holdings were eligible to vote (Harrison 2005, 98–99). A county representative tasked with appointing a voter-registration committee visited Jin's family home to inform her father that he was eligible (Alsford 2010b). At some point in either the late 1920s or early 1930s, during a village election likely

held at the city god temple, a fight broke out between villages, and Jin's father was killed. Her elder brother took over most of the family business. Jin recalls that she was never allowed to eat at the dining table with her brother and could only eat in the kitchen, though she had prepared all the food (Alsford 2010b).

Until she was seventeen, Jin's only journey away from her hometown was a trip to a temple that took six or seven hours by foot and involved staying at the temple overnight and returning the following day. Jin was able to recount the details of that visit vividly.

Jin had a cousin, Chen Meixiang, who lived in Ningbo. Chen's family was financially better off than Jin's, and she was trained as a nurse (her feet were bound). Chen's husband, Zhang Zhaoze, was an American-trained pilot serving as part of the Flying Tigers in the ROC Air Force. He, too, was from a well-to-do background. Chen and Zhang had four children and were based in Nanjing (Alsford 2010b). Chen knew that her family might soon move with the air force and asked Jin if she would consider moving to Nanjing to help her. Jin excitedly agreed. For Jin, there was no reason to stay at home. Her mother had passed away, and her older brother's spouse treated her poorly, forcing her to perform duties like those of a servant (Alsford 2010b). As a result, she made her first big move at the age of seventeen. Accompanied by a relative, she left for Haimen. They walked at night and slept during the day to avoid robbers. From Haimen, they continued to Ningbo, where they took a boat to Nanjing.

Jin lived in Nanjing for two years. In 1948, Zhang Zhaoze's Air Force Team 4 was sent to Taiwan (ROC Air Force n.d.). Chen, the children, and Jin were permitted to follow as military dependents. Following the order, they flew to Chiayi. Jin knew that a long stay in Taiwan would require registering through the household registration system. To legitimize living with her cousin, they faked Jin's identity, claiming she was Chen's sister. Jin had to change her family name to Chen, which she hated for the rest of her life. She specifically asked her son to change her family name back following her death. Her birthday was also changed (Alsford 2019b), adding six years to her age.

Jin Su-qin's story is Kafkaesque. When she boarded the plane in 1947, she had a history, a belonging. She exited the plane in disguise and placeless.

Her life in Taiwan did not start easily. Her role in her cousin's household was closer to that of a servant. Her main task was to look after the children. It was her job to take the children to school, where she met her future husband, Wang Hsi-chi, who was working as a janitor at the school. As the only son to a rich landlord and merchant who traded between Wuxi, Jiangsu, and Shanghai, Wang was spoiled. (The family suffered greatly later, during the Cultural Revolution, when landlords were targeted.) He lacked interest in anything academic, caring more about having fun. He did not attend school but instead had a private tutor at home. Wang's departure from home was not planned. He got into a dispute with his father's third wife and, in a fit of anger, threw a teacup at her. Unfortunately, she passed out, bleeding from the head. In that moment, Wang believed he had killed her. He escaped and went to Shanghai to stay with his aunt, who owned a hotel and a theater. During his stay in Shanghai, he joined the KMT army when Chiang Kai-shek campaigned in 1944 for the "100,000 young people, 100,000 soldiers" (*shiwan qingnian shiwan jun*; Alsford 2019b). Wang's troop was sent to Chiayi in 1948.

Between late 1948 and early 1949, the main group evacuated from the mainland comprised business elites, families, prominent statesmen, and some urban professionals—in other words, those who could finance the voyage themselves. The next group to migrate arrived in Taiwan starting in the summer of 1949 and was often referred to as the "forty-niners." Continuing into the 1950s, these migrants came from vastly different backgrounds, including the "raggedy" soldiers and "peasants," a number of whom had no idea that Taiwan would be their final destination (Dominic Yang 2021, 42). This included the fourteen thousand Chinese prisoners of war captured by US and UN troops in Korea during the Korean War, who entered Taiwan along with evacuees of the Dachen Islands (Dachen Zhudao). In 1955. Wang Hsi-chi left China with the forty-niners. For Jin Su-qin, as one of the early birds of late 1948 and early 1949, the crossing was largely accidental but not perilous. Her entry into Taiwanese society was not markedly different from those arriving on evacuation vessels. She, like all the others, including her future husband, would start again as a placeless person.

After arriving in Taiwan, Wang Hsi-chi did not want to stay in the military. For reasons unknown, he managed to get a three-month furlough from his company (Alsford 2019b). This was lucky, as his company was shortly after mobilized to fight against the Communists. None returned. He took a job as a janitor at the newly formed air force elementary school, where he met Jin and married her soon afterward. At that time, the KMT forbade soldiers to marry in Taiwan. Wang rationalized that "he was on a break" and was "not a soldier but a janitor" at the time (Alsford 2019b). They got married at Chaiyi District Court. Jin's decision was not entirely motivated by love, but rather was an opportunity to leave her cousin and live her own life. She remarked in an interview that her wedding day was the only time she had worn makeup in her entire life (Alsford 2010b).

In 1951–52, the KMT started to arrest soldiers who attempted to desert. Wang found himself in trouble. Nevertheless, as Zhang Zhaoze held a high rank in the air force, he was able to arrange a job for Wang at Chiayi Air Force Base in Shuishang. Wang thus migrated from the army to the air force. Shortly after moving into a house near the base, they welcomed their first son, Wang Hsu-kang. Following the birth of a second son, a third and a fourth were born in quick succession.

Wang was not an ideal husband (Alsford 2010b). He was often irresponsible and enjoyed gambling, and he could not apply for any benefits for his family, since he was not supposed to get married in the first place. As a result, Jin was often left to support the family all by herself. She sold food to those stationed at the base, ran a noodle stand outside of the Chiayi train station, and put her farming skills into practice by raising ducks and pigs. In her last job, she ran a small dumpling restaurant.

Wang Hsi-chi died in 1991 in a car accident. He always maintained a guest mentality, as if living Taiwan was merely temporary. He, like Jin and the others who came in the great exodus, were conditioned to believe in three ipseities: identification with the Kuomintang, identification with the province of their birth, and finally the cultural prejudice that marked them in Taiwan society as *waishengren* (Corcuff 2002, 173). Wang's imagined reality became complicated when he finally got the chance to return to China shortly before his death. He was shocked to find that the CCP had confiscated everything his family once owned and that the younger brother born after Wang left (by his father's third wife, who was the reason he left

home) looked older than him. His brother told him that the Wang family had been badly tortured for being a landlord family and for having a son who had joined the KMT. The little brother and his children were denied an education and were allowed to perform only the lowest jobs as a result. Wang went back to Taiwan feeling extremely confused. He lost interest in returning to China. As for Jin, she never wanted to see her hometown again. She told me that the girl from the village had only negative memories (Alsford 2010b). As Edward Said puts it, the pathos of exile is the impossibility of return (Said 2012, xxxv).

Jin's cousin's family emigrated to the United States after all their children completed university. Chen asked Jin to join her in the United States, stating that she was lonely. Jin declined. She was no longer alone, as she had her own children and grandchildren (Alsford 2019b).

Jin lived in Taiwan for sixty-five years. She spoke Hokkien with a strong accent but had forgotten the language of her hometown. In 2012, she died of heart disease.

Jin Su-qin was a *waishengren*. She came to Taiwan during the great exodus. Although she came with the elites, Jin did not belong with them. Jin's relocation to Taiwan would shape the narrative of the island and would in return define her as being *waisheng*, outside. As an individual she had no role in the ill tidings brought about by her arrival. The year 1948 was monumental for Jin. It changed her life. She arrived in Taiwan not as a politically strong advocate for the Chinese Nationalists but as part of a complex social upheaval that had profound and wide-ranging repercussions in Taiwan, eventually leading to a period of terror.

MARTIAL LAW

1947–1987

18

A Tangwai's Tale

HUANG HSIN-CHIEH

Listen to the voice of the people.
LEE TENG-HUI · 1984

The year 2017 marked several important observances in the modern political history of Taiwan. It had been seventy years since the 228 Incident and thirty years since the lifting of martial law. The four decades between the 228 Incident and the lifting of martial law had witnessed remarkable transformations on the island. Documentation of this change, however, has for the most part focused on the island's economic and political transitions. During the 1950s, Taiwan experienced a series of land reform and community development programs, primarily led by the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction. The notion of "developing agriculture by virtue of industry and fostering industry by virtue of agriculture" (*yi nongye peiyang gongye, yi gongye fazhan nongye*) had by 1961 resulted in two four-year economic plans. The period between 1963 and 1973, considered "a golden age" of economic growth in Taiwan, saw the island become one of the four Asian tigers (the others being South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong; Kim 1998). This economic success story, often referred to as the "Taiwan Miracle," arguably aided the island in its transformation into a liberal democracy (Gold 1986, 130–31).

This economic shift, which opened up opportunities in the labor market, sparked a significant rise in social mobility. By the late 1970s and early 1980s,

the new middle class of Taiwan and the free enterprise that had permitted its emergence become important markers in the people's demand for greater rights and more democratic processes. The development of civil society in Taiwan was a major turning point in the history of democracy on the island, the foundations of which can arguably be found in the Kaohsiung Incident on 10 December 1979.

To commemorate Human Rights Day, a date chosen to echo the United Nations General Assembly's adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a demonstration was organized by *Formosa Magazine*, led by Huang Hsin-chieh and other members of the Tangwai, whose purpose was to promote democracy. The incident that occurred on 10 December had its roots a day earlier, when two campaign wagons (dispatched by *Formosa Magazine*) broadcast the Human Rights Forum. Police held up the procession, and two volunteers were arrested, prompting several of the Tangwai to gather outside the Gushan branch of the Police Security Bureau, where the two were being held. The outrage felt at the arrest prompted a number of the Tangwai and its followers to attend the following day's demonstration even though they had not previously planned to do so. On 10 December, four hours before the planned gathering (between 2 and 3 p.m.), the authorities—including the military police, the army, and the police—took up positions in the vicinity. As the event unfolded, military police began to close in on the demonstrators. Panic set in as demonstrators clashed with the authorities, and the Kuomintang (KMT) used the incident as an excuse to arrest well-known opposition leaders.

The subsequent military trials of the eight key defendants, known as the Kaohsiung Eight—Chang Chun-hung, Huang Hsin-chieh, Chen Chu, Yao Chia-wen, Shih Ming-teh, Lu Hsiu-lien, Lin Hung-hsuan, and Lin Yi-hsiung—took place along with thirty-three other civilian trials. Due to space constraints, a comprehensive analysis is not feasible at this juncture. Nonetheless, J. Bruce Jacobs's examination of the Kaohsiung Incident provides a significant perspective on the intellectual history of Taiwan's democratic movements (Jacobs 2016). This perspective allows for a deeper exploration of the knowledge generated, debated, documented, and notably put into action by Taiwanese intellectuals during the era of martial law. This is particularly noticeable in the identities of certain defense lawyers involved in the trials. Chief among those are the lawyer for Huang Hsin-chieh, Chen Shui-bian, who served as president in 2000–2008, and Yao Chia-wen's representative, Su Tseng-chang, who became chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party (2012–14).

Born on 20 August 1920 in Dalongdong, which is nestled between the Tamsui and Keelung Rivers north of Dadaocheng, Huang Hsin-chieh was the son of a rice mill owner. As was common then, Huang's father consulted a fortune teller to provide a suitable name for his son. The fortune teller said the boy would grow up to become an important official, so Chin-lung, meaning "Golden Dragon," would be most suitable. Huang changed his name in 1958 to Hsin-chieh when admiration for Japanese politician Kishi Nobusuke led him to take the kanji of Nobusuke as his new name.

Huang's mother, Lien Hao, was from a merchant family that owned and ran a shop on Dihua Street in Dadaocheng (Li Po-chuan 2003, 32). Her older brother Lien Wen-ching was a known activist during the Japanese period and participated in the Taiwanese Cultural Association. During the Second World War, Huang's father's business started to decline. Huang, who was only a teenager, decided to help the family by finding a job. He left school and began work as an intern at a metal factory, but he would later quit this occupation due to the meager wages. In 1940, he traveled to Tokyo to work at a printing factory. Meanwhile, he enrolled in a five-year middle and high school program, completing his degree at what is now Ueno High School.

In 1946, Huang returned to Taiwan and got a job as a print worker for Taiwan Bank. He studied Mandarin and took the university entrance exam for all universities in the Republic of China. Though offered a place at Peking University, he was unable to attend due to the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War. In 1949, he received an offer from the Taiwan Administration Junior College (Taiwan Xingzheng Zhuanke Xuexiao), which would later become part of National Chung Hsing University. During this period, he became passionate about politics. He joined the KMT and became a KMT student leader. The school encouraged him to support the independent candidate Wu San-lien for Taipei City mayor in February 1950 as the KMT had not selected a candidate that year. Huang graduated

in 1951. In 1954, he married Chang Yueh-ching, whose family owned a textile shop in Dadaocheng (Li Po-chuan 2003, 34).

In the second Taipei City mayoral election in 1954, Huang supported the KMT candidate, who lost to Independent candidate Kao Yu-shu (Henry Kao). After this defeat, Huang reconsidered his membership in the KMT. Meanwhile, his father funded him in various businesses, but they never worked out. He told his father that he was passionate about politics, so his father introduced him to Li Fu-chun, who was one of Kao Yu-shu's main assistants. In 1957 Huang left the KMT and later that year joined Kao's reelection campaign team (Li Po-chuan 2003, 42–43). During this period Huang started to show his political potential. Despite his youth, he was considered a good speaker, and he had majored in politics. Lee Teng-hui had noticed Huang at the time (Huang Huang-hsiung 2018), impressed by the young man's promotion of democracy. Meanwhile, Huang became increasingly disappointed in the KMT, feeling that the party's political apparatus was corrupt (Li Po-chuan 2003, 42–45).

In 1961, when Huang was only thirty-three, he ran for Taipei City councilor and was elected. Three years later, he was reelected. In 1969, he successfully secured a seat in the Legislative Yuan. In 1975, Huang , along with Kang Ning-hsiang, a fellow non-KMT politician, founded *Taiwan Politics* magazine (Taiwan zhenglun). During the 1977–78 elections, Huang used his position to actively support non-KMT candidates in local elections. In August 1978, he established *Formosa Magazine* (Meilidao zazhi), which played a significant role in shaping a political party. However, following the Kaohsiung Incident in December of the same year, Huang was arrested.

In a trial in March 1980, Huang was sentenced to fourteen years. He was released on parole in 1987, the year martial law was lifted. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had been established the year before his parole. One year after his release, Huang became a member of the newly established party. In October 1988, he was elected as party leader and successfully reelected the subsequent year. In 1989, the DPP introduced Taiwan independence policies in the run-up to the local government elections, and these policies were published in the *Independence Evening Post* (Chen Yi-shen 2010, 155). In spite of government threats to bring him to court, the DPP continued to push an independent agenda (DPP Huang Huang Hsin-chieh Editorial Group 2000, 247–50). The DPP successes in the election of six mayors were especially important. Among the most important were Taipei County and Kaohsiung (Rigger 1999, 138–39).

In 1990, during the Wild Lily movement, Huang supported the student activists. The police, however, quickly had him removed. His treatment by the police was widely reported (Tsai Yu-jen 2003, 78–79), resulting in criticism by the general public of his treatment. As a result, Lee Teng-hui, who had claimed he had no idea what was happening, apologized and invited Huang to have a discussion at the presidential office (Tsai Yu-jen 2003, 79)—the first such meeting for an opposition leader. On 30 November 1999, Huang Hsin-chieh died of a heart attack. His final resting place is in Bali on the banks of the River Tamsui.

The Tangwai was a loosely knit group of political opponents to the authoritarian KMT government. The earliest figures in the movement were Huang Hsin-chieh and Kang Ning-hsiang in the 1970s. They began to collaborate more closely following the publication of the *Taiwan Politics* magazine in 1975. The chief aim of the movement was unity. Its goal was to unite the opposition in a quest for democracy. This alliance, most visible at the grassroots level, bore fruit in the 1977 election, a marked turning point in Taiwan's political development (Rigger 1999, 114), when the Tangwai won four local executive and twenty-one Provincial Assembly seats (Fell 2012, 25). The exposed deep-rooted support for the opposition revealed a rift between the KMT and local factions. Many in the Tangwai would interpret this as evidence of mass local support.

Like the political activism of Chiang Wei-shui (see chapter 14), the public sphere provided an important discursive arena. Yet the KMT's brutality toward members of the opposition meant that discussions needed to be secret. For the Tangwai, teahouses offered a critical site of intellectual exchange. They provided a space of political communication and opposition activism. In Taipei, locations such as the Wisteria Tea House, a two-story Japanese house in the Daan District close to National Taiwan University, occupied an important position in the political culture of Taiwan in the 1950s

(Alsford 2012, 286). Originally the residence of a Japanese official during the colonial period, the building was confiscated following the arrival of the Chinese Nationalists and turned into a residence for the KMT official Chou Te-wei. His son, Chou Yu, an artist, inherited the house in 1976.

Chou Yu, a political activist and a member of the Tangwai, opened up the premises for political discussion groups. As a teahouse, it provided a safe house for political dissidents, the avant-garde for revisionist expression, and Tangwai supporters (Chou Yu n.d.). The Wisteria Tea House became a hub for radical discussions, fostering a vibrant social environment that attracted new ideas, thinkers, and radicals, thus contributing to the development of a dynamic civil society. The tea house played a pivotal role in shaping the political perspectives of activists like Huang Hsin-chieh, while also serving as a regular meeting spot for prominent lawyers such as Chen Shui-bian and Hsieh Chang-ting. As a vital social institution, Wisteria Tea House became a catalyst for Taiwan's renewed nationalism and served as a caffeinated pathway to democratization.

Although the Tangwai were ultimately successful in forming the DPP in 1986, many saw the 1977 election as the moment when this confederation of academics and like-minded intellectuals split between moderates, such as Kang Ning-hsiang, and a more radical branch under Huang Hsin-chieh. The trigger was a violent episode at the Chungli polling station on 19 November 1977, when approximately one thousand people were protesting suspected election fraud. In the violence, one protestor died and the police station in Chungli was set on fire. Frictions within the Tangwai movement gave rise to divergent perspectives, with some contending that the violence served as evidence of widespread support, while others, adopting a more moderate stance, advocated for avoiding mass demonstrations (Rigger 1999, 115–16).

Divides in the Tangwai continued, and differences were again highlighted on 16 December 1978 when President Jimmy Carter announced a normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The timing was unfortunate, as the announcement came just days before local elections in Taiwan were to be held. The government postponed the election, saying that Taiwan could not afford instability. Moderates in the Tangwai, including Kang, agreed with the government. This position aggravated the radicals, and the divisions deepened. Tension

was further exacerbated on 22 January 1979, when Yu Teng-fa, the Kaohsiung County executive and a Tangwai-linked follower, was arrested for a planned protest over the election postponement. Many in the radical branch of the Tangwai gathered to protest his arrest and formed the core faction that would be named, after their magazine, Formosa.

19

A Prisoner's Tale

CHEN CHU

My beloved fellow Taiwanese, all of you with a conscience, with compassion, my name is Lu Hsiu-lien. I'm from Taoyuan. Today, December 10, is International Human Rights Day. For hundreds of years, Taiwanese have never had a chance like they have today.

LU HSIU-LIEN · 2014

Taiwan built its democracy at a time when the international community essentially turned its back on the island. For the Taiwanese people, democracy is not merely a static concept but an ongoing process, embodying both action and a tangible reality. To maintain a democracy requires sacrifice. And the challenge of legitimizing the detention of those who spoke critically of the KMT led to the use of the terms *political prisoner* (zhengzhifan), *thought-crime prisoner* (sixiangfan), and *political thought-crime prisoner* (zhengzhi sixiangfan). Penal practice in Taiwan, however, was not a product of the Chinese Nationalists. It was shaped by Japan, and prison designs marked the regime's militarization. Taiwan sat at the margins of empire but was at the forefront of Japan's colonial experimentation—a centralized system that has been termed a "colonial police sphere" (Ts'ai 2009, 68). For Hui-yu Ts'ai, the Japanese-controlled police systems held sway over the Taiwanese population during various stages of its colonial rule, while also effectively maintaining law, order, and governance (71). Japan's colonial engineering in

the name of modernity adopted Western ideas of a "correctional facility," and this, importantly, occurred at a moment of reform that put Taiwan on a different penal track from China (Shu-mei Huang and Hyung Kyung Lee 2020, 95). The Manchus had built prison facilities following their colonization of the island in the seventeenth century, but these were short-term facilities for prisoners awaiting punishment or execution (Allee 1994, 236). Following its reform during the Japanese colonial period, the penal system in Taiwan became crucial not only for suppressing nationalistic anti-Japanese sentimentality but also for managing socialist movements. The Republic of China would adopt this system following the 228 Incident and when it imposed martial law on 20 May 1949.

Martial law in Taiwan lasted for thirty-eight years, ending on 14 July 1987. Only Syria had a longer period of martial law. The Order of Martial Law (Jieyan Ling) was enacted by Chen Cheng, chairman of the Taiwan Provincial Government after Chen Yi and Wei Tao-ming. The law included the Internal Security of the State in the Criminal Code, the Traitors' Punishment Act, and the Statute to Prevent Espionage. To police this, the KMT formed various secret agencies and military tribunals. This led to a climate of improper trials and eradication of civil liberties (H. W. Lin 2015, 265).

When President Jimmy Carter established formal diplomatic relations with the PRC on 16 December 1978, Chiang Ching-kuo postponed National Assembly and legislative elections, citing the need for stability in Taiwan. Former vice president Lu Hsiu-lien speculates in her biography that the timing of the US decision had conflicting explanations. She argues that the possibilities included that the United States felt "sorry" for the KMT and "did it a favor by announcing early to give them [KMT] an excuse to cancel the elections." A second theory was that Chiang Ching-kuo had asked the United States to announce the decision prior to the elections as a "token of goodwill." A third theory posits that Beijing was able to exert enough pressure to force Washington to make the unexpected announcement quickly (Lu and Esarey 2014, 94). The KMT's loss of seats a year earlier, in the 1977 municipal executive, municipal council, and Provincial Assembly elections, was a significant turning point in Taiwan's political

development that triggered fears the KMT was losing political control (Rigger 1999, 114–15).

Elections became the crucial platform through which opposition politicians could showcase their cause. However, the postponement of the National Assembly and legislative elections exposed the deepening divisions within the Tangwai movement, specifically between moderates and radicals. The suspension of the elections forced the opposition to seek a new strategy to force political reform. Large-scale demonstrations and new political magazines were manifestations of a new populist front opposing KMT rule (Lu and Esarey 2014, 99). This would culminate a year later, in December 1979, with the prodemocracy demonstrations in Kaohsiung.

Nine weeks after the demonstrators' arrests, on 20 February 1980, the Taiwan Garrison Command announced that the Kaohsiung Eight would be tried in a military court, charged with *panluan* (rebellion or sedition; Jacobs 2016, 34). The trial began on 18 March, and a month later, three weeks after the conclusion of the trial, the judges delivered their verdict: Shih Ming-teh received a life sentence, Huang Hsin-chieh got fourteen years, and the remaining six were given twelve years each. Shih Ming-teh was incarcerated on Green Island, later joined by Lin Hung-hsuan.

Green Island (Ludao), known formally as Burnt Island (Huoshaodao), due to the visual display the island makes at sundown, lies just thirty-three kilometers off the southeast coast of Taiwan's main island. Its history as a prison, however, began with the Japanese. Built between 1911 and 1919, the Burnt Island Detention Center for Vagrants was chosen for its location. Much like Alcatraz, just off the coast of San Francisco, it was built to detain. As an island it was difficult to escape. The sea provided an additional boundary around the prisoners that was physical as well as mental. Following the arrival of the Chinese Nationalists, the prison was reestablished to hold prisoners of conscience. From 1951 to 1965 it was called the New Life Correction Center (NLCC), after which it became the Ministry of National Defense Green Island Reform and Reeducation Prison, also crudely known as Oasis Villa (Chen I-Shen 2008, 13). The island also became the headquarters of the Taiwan Garrison Command. The NLCC comprised both cell blocks and guard barracks. In the 1950s, the prisoners were divided into twelve teams, with one all-female group. A total of around three thousand prisoners could be held there at any one time (H. W. Lin

2015, 266). As more and more political prisoners were moved out of city and county prisons, most were sent to Green Island for hard labor and "thought reform" (Chen I-Shen 2008, 13–16). It has often been said that Green Island, as a prison for opposition intellectuals, had the highest density of doctors and the highest average educational level in all the ROC at the time (Chen I-Shen 2015, 9–18; Huang Jui-hung 2018).

In 2001, under the government of Huang Hsin-chieh's lawyer, Chen Shui-bian, the DPP opened Green Island Human Rights Culture Park (Ludao Renquan Wenhua Yuanqu), which later changed its name to Green Island White Terror Memorial Park (Baise Kongbu Ludao Jinian Yuanqu) to commemorate those who fought for Taiwan's democracy. Although the protagonist of this tale, Chen Chu, was not incarcerated at Green Island, context regarding the island is essential, as its location widely symbolizes the plight of political prisoners throughout the period of White Terror.

Born 10 June 1950 to a large farming family in Yilan, Chen Chu was deeply influenced by her mother, a woman she describes as having great perseverance and determination. Her mother, Chen Lin Lien-hua, was a *sim-pū-á*. The Japanese sent her father, Chen Atu, to the Philippines during the Second World War. Chen's mother was determined that her daughter be properly educated and insisted that Chen pursue her education beyond that of many of her peers. Chen was the first girl in her family to go to junior high school. She graduated from Shih Hsin Junior college, now Shih Hsin University, in 1968, with a degree in library and information science (Lin Hsing-fei 2017, 24–45; Wu Jen-chieh 2018).

Shortly after she arrived in Taipei in 1969, during her freshman year at college, Chen started work as a secretary for Kuo Yu-hsin. Kuo was then councilor on the Taiwan Provincial Council. When his former secretary left the job, he asked Chen to help him out on weekends until he could find a suitable replacement (Chieh Chu-shu 2018). Kuo was an important mentor to Chen. He was also from Yilan, and to many people there, Kuo was the spokesperson for the farming class (Chen Chu n.d). After graduating, Chen increased her hours to full-time. Although Kuo was not openly against the Republic of China, he firmly opposed the KMT dictatorship. In 1960, he

had helped set up the China Democracy Party (Zhongguo Minzhudang) as a way to resist the KMT's single-party rule (Rigger 1999, 104–5). The attempt to establish an opposition failed, and many were arrested. Kuo escaped imprisonment but was continuously monitored by the secret service even after moving to the United States in 1977, where he established the Overseas Alliance of Taiwan Democracy Movement.

Chen had known Kuo since childhood, and she became his secretary not out of political ideology but to finance her education. As she began to learn more about her job and the people around her, she started to notice that she was being watched and Kuo was being followed. Several incidents she witnessed, including ballot stuffing, convinced Chen to join the Tangwai and become an activist. The KMT used the Kaohsiung Incident as an excuse to arrest all well-known opposition leaders. Kuo had left Taiwan for the United States before the incident; however, Chen was arrested as part of the Kaohsiung Eight, and in March–April 1980, she was tried at a military court.

Chen was jailed in Taiwan's Jen-ai Educational Experimental Institute (Taiwan Renai Jiaoyu Shiyansuo) in Taipei. She was sentenced to twelve years but only served six years and two months. During her imprisonment, her mother came to visit her every six months. She had supported Chen's participation in democracy despite not fully understanding exactly what it was all about (Lo 2011).

In 1994, Chen was made head of the Department of Social Welfare at the Taipei City government office. Six years later, following the DPP's election victory, she was appointed minister of the Council of Labor Affairs, the present-day Ministry of Labor. In 2006, she was elected major of Kaohsiung, winning by a small margin of 1,114 votes against the KMT candidate Huang Chun-ying (Lin Hsing-fei 2017, 46–55). Huang contested the result in court, but Chen prevailed. In 2010, Kaohsiung City and Kaohsiung County were combined, and Chen was elected mayor of the special municipality of Kaohsiung City. She was reelected in 2014 and served a total of twelve years as mayor of Kaohsiung before becoming secretary-general to the Tsai Ing-wen in 2018. In June 2020, Chen Chu was appointed president of the Control Yuan.

Though she was not imprisoned on Green Island, Chen Chu's name has been engraved on the memorial that pays tribute to the victims of the

White Terror period (Tang Shih 2018). Lee Teng-hui, who experienced detention and interrogation by the Taiwan Garrison Command in 1969, was later invited to join Chiang Ching-kuo's cabinet. As president, he established a public memorial dedicated to the victims of the White Terror and became the first to offer an apology on behalf on the KMT in 1995. In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou also extended an apology to the victims and their families.

Chen Chu, like many other Tangwai followers, survived martial law to help lead Taiwan on its journey to a consolidated and mature democracy. This, sadly, was not the case for all, as many sacrificed their lives for the democratic freedoms that Taiwan offers its people today. Concluding this tale, I leave you with a passage from Shawna Yang Ryan's novel, *Green Island*:

> A car pulled out from its spot beneath an oak tree and crawled toward him. He moved aside to let it pass, but instead the car stopped. He glanced around; there would be no witnesses.
>
> "Tang Jia Bao?" someone asked through the open window.
>
> "Hey," Jia Bao confirmed. *Run,* he thought. *Run.*
>
> *Run.*
>
> Jia Bao thought of his wife, standing next to the sofa, phone at her ear, unable to speak.
>
> . . .
>
> The man's hand was shaking. Jia Bao saw the tremor. *He's afraid.* If he had time enough to notice the twitch under the man's skin, he should have run.
>
> Even the bullet didn't speed up time. It tore through his chest. (Ryan 2016, 286)

Tang Jia Bao thus became the fictional representative of the Taiwanese sacrifice for democracy. Being Taiwanese is a cultural ideology that has been shaped by the country's political changes. The Kaohsiung Incident politicized Taiwanese history, and a consciousness rose to advocate opposition to authoritarianism (Hsiau 2000, 158). This resistance has remained constant, and Chen Chu with her twelve-year sentence and six years of imprisonment will forever be sketched not only on the Green Island wall but also on the consciousness of Taiwan's democracy.

24

A President's Tale

TSAI ING-WEN

He was a shepherde and noght a mercenarie.
And thogh he hooly were and vertuous,
He was to synful men nat despitous,
Ne of his speche daungerous ne digne,
But in his techyng discreet and benynge.
GEOFFREY CHAUCER · 1870

So, we have come to our final tale. For Chaucer this was the Parson. Unlike the tales of other pilgrims, this one was neither story nor poem but rather a treatise on penitence. The Parson divides penitence into three parts: contrition of the heart, confession of the mouth, and satisfaction. The Parson, since Chaucer first penned him, has often been portrayed as a man who practices what he preaches. He was, after all, "a shepherd and not a mercenary."

This tale, about a president, also functions as a conclusion. In contradistinction to the first tale, of a male British sojourner in 1864, it features a female president in the twenty-first century. This president is in office not because she comes from a wealthy or powerful family but because she appeals to the electorate. As we conclude, Tsai Ing-wen is in her second term, having been reelected despite strong opposition, misinformation, and foreign interference. She shook off populism and then, less than a month later, demonstrated her prowess by minimizing the impact of COVID-19.

Despite a history of settler colonialism, violence, and conflict, the people who make up this island of 24 million have come together under an umbrella of democracy—a civic identity that they fought for, which emerged first after their betrayal in 1945 and then transformed into a democracy when the world disregarded them. To get here, the island has endured layers of coloniality. Although Taiwan arguably still exists within a framework of colonization, the majority of its people have managed to carve out a postcolonial identity. Therefore, identity reflects the impact that colonial exploitation and domination had on colonized people. There may be one Taiwan, but there is no single Taiwan story.

Taiwan belongs to various groups, and the identity of being from Taiwan holds different levels of significance to different people. Throughout the past four hundred years of colonial settlement, Taiwan has been imagined by numerous individuals or lives. The people of Taiwan have a rich history of reshaping their nation, including its culture and identity, economy and society, politics and status (Rigger 2011, 196). For some, Taiwan, particularly its democracy, has gained a sacred status. Democracy came to Taiwan after four decades of authoritarian rule by a government that had assumed jurisdiction over the island in 1945 and would settle its entire government upon it, in exile, four years later. Movement toward popular rule was fragmentary and negotiated. Democracy was completed in 1996 and consolidated in 2008, when it had gone through four direct presidential elections and a second ruling party transition. With the reelection of the DPP in 2016, Taiwan demonstrated to the world that, in its fourth transition of power, its democracy was both robust and mature.

Despite this maturity, democracy continues to be challenged. The People's Republic of China's economic position and growing international influence has meant that Taiwan is frequently denied access to the global stage. Canadian World Health Organization (WHO) adviser Bruce Aylward's dodging of questions on Taiwan's response to the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 indicates Beijing's latitude in dictating how the world discusses Taiwan.

Since its first democratic milestone with the lifting of martial law in 1987 and its first direct presidential election in 1996, Taiwan has achieved what political scientist Dafydd Fell terms "a series of political miracles" (Fell 2012, 240). After years of enduring cross-strait tension, Taiwan remains a healthy democracy with strong democratic institutions.

The pathway to consolidating democracy has not always been easy. Following the election of Chen Shui-bian in 2000, the DPP administration was accused of supporting a growing Taiwanese nativist movement that was consolidating identity by purging the island of its Chinese past in a process of desinicization. But this view amounted more to a perceived challenge to the KMT's version of *Chinese* nationalism in Taiwan (Hughes 2011, 51). What was actually happening was that this *nativist* movement was shifting an identity, gradually, toward something that was both participatory and civic. Taiwan has, I argue, done this successfully. Nativist movements with notions of nation-state building have tended to be used to legitimize ultranationalist ideology and, in some cases, militarism. The breakup of the former Yugoslavia would be a good point of reference here. Yet, by focusing on civic culture, the Taiwanese were able, in spite of the raw political cleavages in domestic politics, to navigate this danger and come together in celebration of its democratic institutions. One need only be on the streets of Taiwan during election season to witness the extent to which its people see democracy as sacred. Flags and banners of candidates flutter in the breeze, and heated discussions and debates echo out from TV sets and radios in workplaces and homes.

Taiwan is a multiparty representative republic headed by a president. The structure of its government is based on the principles of Sun Yat-sen's *Three Principles of the People*. There are five branches of government, known as *yuan*: executive, legislative, judicial, examination, and control. The president and vice president are elected through a popular vote system every four years with a maximum of two four-year terms. The current elected president is Tsai Ing-wen, with Lai Ching-te as her vice president and Su Tseng-chang as premier, the head of the executive branch.

On 31 August 1956 at the George Mackay Hospital in Taipei, Chang Chin-feng gave birth to her final child, Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai's father, Tsai Chieh-sheng, was originally from Fangshan in Pingtung County, Hakka on his father's side and Paiwan on his mother's. Tsai's Paiwan name is Tjuku, meaning "round like the sun, a daughter of a chief." Tsai Chieh-sheng's early life was similar to that of the *shōnenkō*, although his motivation differed. At eighteen, during the Second World War, he went to Dalian—then part of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo—where he trained as a mechanic to repair aircraft (Tsai Ing-wen 2011). Unlike the *shōnenkō*, he went to Dalian to avoid being sent to Southeast Asia. After the war, he returned to Pingtung and established a delivery company and auto repair shop. In 1968, he expanded his business and moved to Taipei. Aside from his established trades, Tsai began trading in secondhand automobiles. During this time, he had noticed a demand for cars in the American expat and military communities. He hired English teachers for his staff, and by 1979, he had accumulated enough capital to invest in real estate. Tsai purchased land in the Zhongshan District of Taipei City, which proved to be very profitable. Toward the end of the martial law period, Tsai donated significantly to the Tangwai, and following the establishment of the DPP, he contributed financially to the party.

Tsai had four wives and eleven children. Tsai Ing-wen's mother was his fourth wife, with whom he parented four children. As the youngest of eleven siblings, Tsai Ing-wen was the most pampered. Tsai entered National Taiwan University in 1974 to study law. After graduation she left for the United States and graduated with an LLM from Cornell Law School in 1980. Following this, she moved to London to study for a PhD in law at the London School of Economics (LSE). After graduating from the LSE in 1984, she returned to Taiwan and began lecturing in the Department of Law at National Chengchi University (NCCU). In 1991, she left NCCU, although she remained an adjunct professor, for Soochow University School of Law.

During her university years, Tsai had a number of suitors, but she chose to focus on her studies. During her Cornell years, Tsai had a boyfriend whom she planned to marry. Sadly, he died in a mountain-climbing accident. Her long-term single status led to unfortunate questions concerning her sexuality during her presidential election bid in 2012, which Tsai refused to comment on (Lin Nan-sen 2011). By 2016, the topic no longer came up publicly.

Tsai joined the DPP in 2004 and became a legislator the following year. In 2006, she was invited to serve as vice premier, a position she held until the end of 2007. Following the success of Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT in

2008, in opposition, Tsai was elected as the first female chairperson of the DPP for two consecutive terms (2008–10 and 2010–12). Following her defeat by Ma in the 2012 presidential election, she returned to being chairperson in 2014. She held this position until 2016, when she was elected president.

Often seen as the president of the status quo, she appeals to the middle-ground electorate. In her first inauguration speech, she stated her policies, including a controversial pension reform plan, care for the elderly, transitional justice, and judicial reform (Tsai Ing-wen 2016). Her economic plan was all about diversification. She prioritized innovative industries and core development via a new Southbound Policy that aimed to enhance cooperation and exchange with eighteen countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Australasia. Her cross-strait policy was clear. She acknowledged that her predecessor had framed relations under the so-called 1992 Consensus (an acceptance that there is one China but there are different interpretations; *yizhong gebiao, yige zhongguo gezi biaoshu*), but she could not agree to it. Instead, she reiterated the importance of continued dialogue.

Under Tsai's administration, the DPP has shifted from being the issue-based party of the Tangwai movement to a more liberal progressive party, putting Taiwan's politics on a more common left-right spectrum. Tsai's government favors action to reduce unemployment by introducing incentives for entrepreneurship among the youth. It also pursues an agenda to expand public housing and mandate childcare support (Tsai Ing-wen 2017). She has proactively engaged with Taiwan Indigenous issues—the Indigenous Languages Development Act took effect in June 2017—and has shown support for LGBTQ rights. Under her presidency, same-sex marriage was legalized in 2018. Debates surrounding immigration—Taiwan does not yet have a refugee policy—and issues of crime and punishment, particularly the death penalty, remain relatively conservative in Taiwanese society but are continually discussed.

Tsai Ing-wen has had a profound impact on Taiwan through her tenure as seventh president of the ROC on Taiwan. She has demonstrated remarkable determination and resilience in navigating a range of complex domestic and international challenges, particularly in light of shifting geopolitical dynamics and China's increasingly assertive stance. As leader, she has been steadfast in upholding democratic values, human rights, and social justice, evident through various policy initiatives and reforms. Tsai has positioned the DPP as a progressive force in cross-strait relations and has sought to establish Taiwan as a world leader in sustainable development. Her strong commitment to the status quo has left an indelible mark on Taiwan's political landscape. Tsai's vision and integrity as president will undoubtedly shape the trajectory of the country's future.